Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money Applications in Africa by Harris, Andrew et al.
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 8
Issue 3 Mobile Money Symposium Article 5
1-1-2013
Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with
Mobile Money Applications in Africa
Andrew Harris
Seymour Goodman
Patrick Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Comparative and Foreign Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew Harris, Seymour Goodman & Patrick Traynor, Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money Applications in
Africa, 8 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 245 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol8/iss3/5
WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS 
VOLUME 8, ISSUE 3 MOBILE MONEY SYMPOSIUM 2013 
 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH 
MOBILE MONEY APPLICATIONS IN AFRICA 
 
Andrew Harris, Seymour Goodman, and Patrick Traynor* 
© Andrew Harris, Seymour Goodman, and Patrick Traynor 
 
Cite as: 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 245 (2013) 
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1198 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The rapid adoption of mobile money use in Africa 
raises concerns regarding the privacy and security of 
users, particularly in light of Financial Action Task Force 
recommendations requiring user transparency and the 
collection of transaction data. The transparency required 
of the now-financially-included—particularly in nations 
with weak adherence to the rule of law and limited privacy 
protections—leaves users vulnerable to abuse. Further, the 
increasing complexity of mobile phone use that is indicative 
of mobile money applications raises concerns regarding 
Africa’s preparedness for heightened security threats that 
come hand in hand with increased use. To address these 
problems, the authors of this Article recommend specific 
policy actions by African nations to improve consumer 
privacy and cybersecurity, supported by policies of  
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industrialized nations like the United States and 
responsible corporate behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decade, mobile telephony has enjoyed 
phenomenal adoption rates across most of Africa. Since 2005, 
there has been a five-fold increase in the number of African mobile 
phone subscriptions resulting in 53.1 mobile phone subscriptions 
per 100 inhabitants in 2011.1 While other areas of the world have 
adopted mobile phones to an even greater degree, the relative 
impact in Africa, where fixed telephone lines are available to less 
than 2 percent of the population, is perhaps greater than anywhere 
else. As the primary means of communication for most Africans, 
mobile phones have become a source of significant economic 
growth and a platform for innovation. One of the most dynamic of 
these innovations has been mobile money, the use of mobile 
phones to purchase goods or services through funds connected to 
the user’s account. With a broad base of mobile phone users 
1 Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service 
Sector, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ 
at_glance/keytelecom.html (last visited July 28, 2012). 
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already in place, the widespread adoption of mobile money could 
have enormous positive impacts across Africa. On a continent with 
too few banking options necessary for a dynamic and modern 
economy, mobile money has the potential to address long-existing 
gaps in African economies.2 Unfortunately, the rapid growth of 
mobile telephony in Africa has not been accompanied by 
appropriate consideration for privacy and security concerns, 
opening the door for abuse and erosion of the application’s utility. 
In light of limited privacy protections and a vulnerable cyber 
environment, the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) raise a number of concerns associated with mobile money 
in Africa. As a financial service, the FATF Recommendations 
apply to mobile money just as with traditional banking services. 
The global effort to combat money laundering and terrorism is as 
applicable to mobile money services as to traditional banking. 
From a general security perspective, the identification, verification, 
and reporting requirements of the FATF Recommendations are a 
positive effort to ensure that mobile money applications do not 
become tools for money laundering. The requirements for user 
transparency, however, introduce a potential problem. FATF 
Recommendation 10 states that financial institutions must perform 
Customer Due Diligence, which includes confirming the identity 
of clients and scrutinizing client transactions.3 Further, 
Recommendation 11 requires financial institutions to maintain 
records of all transactions for five years, “to enable them to comply 
swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities.”4 
These requirements for transparency and record keeping pose a 
number of user privacy concerns for mobile money applications in 
Africa, particularly in those nations with weak adherence to the 
2 Mobile Money in Africa: Press 1 for Modernity, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 
28, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21553510. 
3 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: 
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 14-15 (2012), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendati
ons%20(approved%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May%202012%20web
%20version.pdf. 
4 Id. at 15. 
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rule of law and limited privacy protections. Further, the increasing 
complexity of mobile phone use that is indicative of mobile money 
applications raises concerns regarding Africa’s preparedness for 
heightened security threats that come hand in hand with increased 
use. 
 
I. PRIVACY CONCERNS: TRANSPARENT USE WITHOUT PRIVACY 
PROTECTION 
 
According to FATF Recommendations 10 and 11, financial 
institutions should not allow customers to conduct business 
anonymously; and they must maintain user transaction records for 
five years. In most traditional banking settings, this requirement is 
both sensible and non-controversial. It does, however, raise 
significant questions for African users of mobile money services, 
particularly considering the limitations of privacy protections in 
Africa. For instance, a recent UN report noted that amongst the 
members of the East African Community—Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—there is no legislation “that 
clearly defines who can get access to a mobile money trail, and 
how, when or under what conditions such access may be 
obtained.”5 Inadequate privacy protections can lead to abuse by 
governments and data brokers as well as leave personal 
information susceptible to theft or leakage, ultimately damaging 
user trust and limiting adoption and use.  
 
A.  Limited Privacy Protections 
 
There are a number of reasons to explain the limits of privacy 
protection in Africa. First, a strong communitarian strain exists 
throughout much of Africa. This mindset deemphasizes the rights 
of individuals in favor of those of community. In such a context, 
the privacy of individuals is given little consideration.6 Second, 
5 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., Mobile Money for Business Development 
in the East African Community 20 (2012), available at http://unctad.org/ 
en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2012d2_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD]. 
6 See Seymour Goodman & Andrew Harris, Emerging Markets: The 
Coming African Tsunami of Information Insecurity, COMM. OF THE ACM, Dec. 
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traditional economies with limited electronic communication and 
commerce have less need for individual privacy protection as there 
are few means to collect, use, and exploit sensitive information. 
Until very recently, the vast majority of Africans did not engage in 
data compiling transactions. For both of the reasons above, there 
are few established legal protections in African nations. Most 
nations do not formally recognize a right to personal privacy, and 
most do not have laws or regulators in place to monitor abuse.7 
Compounding the lack of legal protections is the relative absence 
of public interest groups to monitor government behavior, propose 
public policy, and promote awareness. This all leads to situations 
where serious abuses can occur with little impediment. Even in 
South Africa, where some legal protections are in place, illegal 
interception and abuse of electronic communications by 
intelligence agencies is routine.8 While a limited privacy 
protection regime may have caused little concern just a short time 
ago, the African boom in mobile telephony significantly heightens 
the risk to consumers operating in an ecosystem without 
protection. 
 
B.  Potential for Abuse 
 
In the context of limited privacy protections and because FATF 
requires identity verification and data collection, African mobile 
money users may find their privacy threatened by governmental 
and corporate abuse. In cash-based economies, the spending and 
savings activities of individuals are known to an interested third 
party only with great effort. This is the environment that most 
Africans have come to understand, developing social behaviors 
reflective of spending that is anonymous to government and 
corporate entities. Despite a lack of privacy protections, the 
2010, at 24, available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1859215&dl= 
ACM&coll=DL&CFID=111892502&CFTOKEN=79495868. 
7 See Hanno N. Olinger et al., Western Privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some 
Critical Comments on the Influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill in 
South Africa, 39 INT’L INFO. & LIBR. REV. 31 (2007). 
8 Heidi Swart, Secret State: How the Government Spies on You, MAIL & 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2011), http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-14-secret-state/. 
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inherent anonymity of cash prevents any other entity from 
knowing the extent of an individual’s transactions. Due to FATF 
requirements, however, the service provider can and must record 
every detail of a user’s transactions in a mobile money 
environment. It is also important to note that the initial wave of 
mobile phone adoption was anonymous, as the vast majority of 
users purchased and used unregistered pre-paid phones. Many 
African nations are now reversing this initial trend by requiring 
SIM-card registration, further reducing anonymity and potentially 
limiting private use.9 The availability of transaction data opens the 
door for abuse by an unscrupulous government, which could gain 
access to transaction records with little effort.10 This information 
could then be used in a number of ways to harass, intimidate, or 
manipulate the violated citizen.  
Corporate abuse of personal information can have similarly 
insidious effects in a mobile money environment without legal 
safeguards. Mobile money services necessarily operate in a data-
rich environment that creates incentives for the commoditization of 
personal information and targeted advertising. A fully employed 
mobile money ecosystem can include a mobile network operator, 
financial institution, trusted service manager, marketer, retailer, 
and the customer. Each of these entities (other than the customer) 
has a growing interest in collecting personal information tied to 
mobile money transactions. With so many interested parties and 
little consumer protection, the opportunities for data leakage and 
subsequent abuse are abundant.11 Liberal collecting and sharing 
policies result in electronic dossiers useful not only for providing 
targeted advertising, but also for making decisions regarding 
9 See Chikaodili Juliet Hemeson, Directive on Consumer Data for SIM 
Card Registration in the Telecommunications Sector: An African Perspective 
(Jan. 8, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982033. 
10 See Louis de Koker & Nicola Jentzsch, Financial Inclusion and Financial 
Integrity: Aligned Incentives? (July 2011) (unpublished conference paper, The 
Shadow Economy, Tax Evasion and Money Laundering Conference), (on file 
with the University of Münster), available at http://dro.deakin.edu.au/ 
view/DU:30041719. 
11 See Andrew Harris et al., Emerging Privacy and Security Concerns for 
Digital Wallet Deployment, in PRIVACY IN AMERICA: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES 185 (William Aspray & Philip Doty eds., 2011). 
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employment or credit worthiness as well as for committing fraud. 
It is important to note that the threats of data leakage are 
amplified in a mobile money environment because how we spend 
is a valuable predictor of who we are and how we will spend or 
possibly otherwise behave in the future. Since FATF requires 
financial institutions to record user transactions, this information is 
necessarily compiled and available for use. The ability to connect 
basic personal information to spending records obtained through 
mobile phones has great commercial use—and potentially misuse. 
In places where mobile money is not yet extensively used, like 
North America and Europe, a spending record connected to the 
user’s mobile phone is less accessible or not available at all, so 
nations in these regions have not yet needed to wrestle fully with 
the implications of mobile money data. But in Africa, mobile 
money data sets are quickly growing. As Africans also begin to use 
their phones to access the Internet, the incentives to commoditize 
this data will grow and present challenges yet unseen in Western 
nations. 
The potential for abuse of private information can harm not 
only the violated citizens, but also the overall economy. If 
governments and businesses abuse users’ trust, they will restrain 
adoption and limit the utility of mobile money, thus limiting the 
application’s utility and holding back their countries. Two of the 
authors witnessed a good illustration of this at a cybersecurity 
conference for East African government officials in Kenya.12 
During a discussion of African broadband adoption, a law 
enforcement official from one of the participating countries stood 
up to proclaim the virtues of Facebook for monitoring and catching 
criminals. Such behavior can have a chilling effect on technology 
adoption, and the brazenness of the statement in a room full of 
government lawyers and officials demonstrates the lack of regard 
for privacy that some in government demonstrate. Calls to monitor 
social media are certainly not confined to Africa, but when 
proposed in industrialized nations, monitoring is suggested only 
within tight restrictions and a devotion to the rule of law.13 In most 
12 East African Cyberspace Workshop, Nairobi, Kenya (July 25-27, 2011). 
13 See SIR DAVID OMAND ET AL., # INTELLIGENCE (2012), available at 
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African nations, there is little to stop governments or corporations 
from pushing the boundaries of acceptable use with regards to 
revealing mobile money data. If widespread abuse becomes 
commonplace, users may walk away from mobile money and all 
its enormous benefits. 
 
II. SECURITY 
 
The growth of mobile money is indicative of a larger trend of 
greater and more sophisticated mobile telephony use—a trend that 
many African nations are ill prepared for, for a host of reasons. As 
user experiences grow richer and smart phone adoption 
increases—a trend well underway14—mobile phones will become 
a more appealing target to a wide range of cyber threats. The 
FATF requirements contribute to this trend by requiring user 
identification and transaction recording, meaning that mobile 
phones become directly linked to financial accounts and rich data 
sets, increasing the desirability for hackers. Smart phones are just 
as susceptible—if not more so—to the same viruses, worms, and 
botnets that plague PCs.15 In this environment, the user might lose 
more than just personal information, but notably money, and be 
susceptible to other forms of crime through exposure via his 
mobile device. The FATF requirements are generally beneficial for 
security issues considering their focus on the serious threats 
associated with terrorism, money laundering, and weapons 
proliferation. Further, FATF may generate constructive pressure by 
forcing regulators to more deeply consider the range of risks 
associated with mobile money. The extent of African cybersecurity 
deficiencies is significant enough, however, that FATF 
requirements alone—which do not address cybersecurity—are 
unlikely to compel improvements. Without proper attention to  
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/_Intelligence_-_web.pdf?1335197327. 
14 Samsung Sees Smartphones Leading African Growth, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/us-samsung-africa-id 
USBRE82L0RU20120322. 
15 GA. TECH INFO. SEC. CTR., EMERGING CYBER THREATS REPORT FOR 2009 
5 (2008), available at http://www.gtisc.gatech.edu/pdf/CyberThreatsReport 
2009. 
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security on the devices that enable mobile money, the user may be 
vulnerable to criminal activity. 
 
A.  Cybersecurity Limitations 
 
This vulnerability is particularly pronounced in the African 
context due to a set of unique challenges that amplify the growing 
insecurity threat. First, most African nations have inadequate laws 
and institutions to confront serious cyber threats.16 While various 
efforts are underway to encourage the adoption of national legal 
frameworks, even these steps have limited effects without 
institutions in place to monitor networks and remediate threats. 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) have become 
valuable assets for performing these necessary functions, but they 
are either lacking or in nascent stages across much of Africa. 
Beyond the institutional and legal inadequacy, African nations 
suffer from a shortage of trained public-sector professionals 
needed in both the policy and operational spaces. This is a 
common problem for all nations, but one that is exacerbated in 
Africa where the number of individuals with advanced information 
security knowledge is relatively lower than elsewhere. Those with 
such knowledge tend to be drawn to the higher paying private 
sector, leaving little expertise for governments. Without capable 
CERTs in place with the commensurate technical expertise to 
operate them, African networks are more vulnerable to cyber 
threats, leaving mobile money users vulnerable to attack and fraud.  
Awareness is another crucial piece of the security equation. 
The rapid adoption of mobile phones and applications like mobile 
money has placed these useful tools in the hands of users with little 
prior experience with technology. Users with limited digital 
literacy are more likely to be unaware of cyber threats, placing 
16 Eric Agwe-Mbarika Akuta et al., Combating Cyber Crime in Sub-Sahara 
Africa; A Discourse on Law, Policy and Practice, 1 J. PEACE, GENDER & DEV. 
STUDIES 129, 131 (2011), available at http://interesjournals.org/JPGDS/pdf/ 
2011/May/Akuta%20et%20al.pdf. 
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themselves and the networks at greater risk.17 Lack of cyber 
awareness is certainly a leading cause of infection across the globe, 
but African nations have a higher proportion of low-capacity users, 
and thus more users unfamiliar with the best practices that can 
limit vulnerability.18 Awareness issues extend beyond the average 
user into the corporate setting as well. Because most African 
companies have evolved in an environment of limited 
interconnectivity, they have had little reason to focus on 
cybersecurity measures and best practices. But now that broadband 
connectivity is growing, it is essential that measures such as 
software standardization and network monitoring be implemented. 
With lax operating procedures in place, corporate behavior can 
open threat vectors, infecting networks and endangering users. It is 
important to remember that a user of a mobile money application 
connected to an infected network is far more vulnerable than a user 
engaging in basic web browsing and email. It is therefore essential 
that heavy network users such as corporations are actively 
protecting the network.  
Because the Internet knows few political boundaries, 
international cooperation on cybersecurity issues is a necessity, but 
few African nations are engaged in cross border law enforcement 
efforts. Only South Africa and Senegal have joined the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, the most significant 
international law enforcement effort to address cybercrime.19 
Further, there are limitations to the assistance developed nations 
are able and willing to provide. First, it is uncommon for 
developed nations to devote significant resources to cyber 
assistance. Most assistance funds are directed at more traditional 
development projects such as health or education. Second, details 
17 See Steven Furnell et al., Security Beliefs and Barriers for Novice Internet 
Users, 27 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 235 (2008). 
18 Marthie Grobler & Joey Jansen van Vuuren, Broadband Broadens Scope 
for Cyber Crime in Africa (Aug. 2010) (unpublished conference paper, Info. 
Security for S. Afr. Conf.), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/ 
articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5588287&contentType=Conference+Publicati
ons&sortType%3Dasc_p_Sequence%26filter%3DAND%28p_IS_Number%3A
5588257%29. 
19 See the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG. 
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of cybersecurity efforts and methodologies are often considered 
classified or restricted information in western nations. These 
nations are reluctant or completely unable to cooperate with 
nations they regard as having lax information security standards. 
All too often this is the case in the African context, making 
western governments unlikely to meaningfully share information 
and cooperate with African states. 
Finally, the state of cybersecurity in Africa is hindered by the 
low prioritization from national leaders. This is of course 
understandable in the African context where limited resources 
must first be allocated to address society’s most fundamental 
problems. The low priority for cybersecurity in the face of other 
pressing issues means that solutions requiring strong governmental 
direction are absent from most African states, further endangering 
vulnerable networks and their applications. For this reason, and for 
the reasons described above, the African continent is likely the 
least safe place to operate a sensitive application like mobile 
money. Further, as mobile money grows more popular, it will 
inevitably become a greater target for criminal activity. If Africa’s 
cybersecurity deficiencies are not addressed in a timely manner, 
the widespread adoption of mobile money may be accompanied by 
widespread mobile money abuse. 
 
B.  Examples of Specific Mobile Money Threats 
 
Without proper attention to basic security features, mobile 
money users introduce themselves to numerous threats, the most 
damaging being the loss of money should an assailant gain 
physical control of the mobile device. Given that nearly 5 percent 
of smartphones issued to or used by employees are lost annually20 
and that only 30 percent of users protect their devices with 
passwords and data encryption,21 the possibility of someone other 
20 PONEMON INST., THE LOST SMARTPHONE PROBLEM: BENCHMARK STUDY 
OF U.S. ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2011), available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/ 
resources/reports/rp-ponemon-lost-smartphone-problem.pdf. 
21 Carole Theriault, Survey Says 70% Don't Password-Protect Mobiles: 
Download Free Mobile Toolkit, NAKED SEC. (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/08/09/free-sophos-mobile-security-
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than a device’s owner using it to gain access to mobile money is 
significant. It should also be noted that such mechanisms only 
offer protection against unsophisticated attackers. In particular, 
prior work has demonstrated that a technically adept adversary 
may be able to take advantage of poor security design within 
mobile money apps22 or simply bypass poorly implemented 
encryption.23 Accordingly, it is critical that both users and 
financial institutions consider a range of risk models.  
More subtle digital attacks against users are also possible. For 
instance, mobile money applications could also be used to isolate 
or burden a potential target. Malicious applications within the 
phones themselves could easily target unsuspecting users. For 
instance, a “trojaned” application could simply fail to allow 
transactions from a target’s phone to clear, dramatically limiting 
the target’s ability to make purchases or move funds. Alternatively, 
the application could illegally track all the purchases made by the 
target, potentially giving the adversary information about the 
target’s strategies and physical location. Finally, such an 
application could make arbitrary purchases on behalf of the target. 
Given that the avenues to contest the legitimacy of such purchases 
are generally lacking (e.g., the presence of the correct PIN made 
with a purchase virtually ensures that liability is held by the target 
and not their financial institution), such an application could 
slowly drain funds from the target’s account. Performed in an 
inconspicuous fashion, such purchases would be unlikely to raise 
alarms in traditional fraud detection systems. With an increasingly 
appealing target for criminals and an environment of cyber 
insecurity, African mobile money uses face an uncertain future. 
  
toolkit/. 
22 See William Enck et al., A Study of Android Application Security (Aug. 
2011) (unpublished conference paper, USENIX), available at 
http://static.usenix.org/events/sec11/tech/full_papers/Enck.pdf.  
23 Ina Fried, At Defcon, Hackers Show How to Hack Your Android Phone 
Encryption, ALL THINGS D (July 28, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://allthingsd.com/ 
20120728/at-defcon-hackers-show-how-to-bypass-android-encryption/. 
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III. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?  
 
Mobile money has enormous potential for the people and 
economies of Africa, yet users must ultimately trust the technology 
if its greatest impact is to be realized. Lurking issues associated 
with personal privacy and cybersecurity currently threaten that user 
trust. Both are global problems requiring global solutions with 
cooperation from all stakeholders. 
 
A.  African Solutions 
 
First and foremost, African nations must recognize the 
importance of digital technologies to the future of their economies. 
While perhaps one of the most dynamic and compelling, mobile 
money is just one of many technologies with the power to help 
transform African economies. With financial resources 
understandably limited, national leaders should take policy actions 
that will increase user trust without requiring exceptional monetary 
and other resource allocations.  
Primary amongst these steps is instituting comprehensive but 
flexible privacy regimes. In reviewing the lack of privacy 
regulation in East Africa, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) declares that “simple and 
transparent mechanisms are needed through which users can 
authorize an entity to access” data associated with mobile money.24 
Individuals should be empowered through national legislation to 
control their personal information and corporations should be 
required to use that information only in contextually appropriate 
ways. Licensing for mobile money services should include explicit 
rules for the collection and sharing of personal information. 
Crucially, it is imperative that lawmakers implement 
comprehensive regulations rather than taking a sectoral approach, 
as has unfolded in the United States. Sector-specific laws may 
prove inadequate for converged technologies like mobile money, 
leaving banks, telecommunications companies, and data brokers 
24 UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 20. 
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with differing requirements leading to inconsistent treatment of 
user data.25 
There have been some recent positive steps regarding privacy 
legislation in Africa. In February 2012, Ghana passed a 
comprehensive data protection bill establishing users’ rights of 
data access, control, and consent of use.26 The bill also creates a 
Data Protection Commission to enforce and regulate the new 
law.27 Further, a draft bill in Kenya specific to electronic retail 
requires user consent for any information sharing.28 Both are 
positive steps and serve as recognition from these two nations of 
the necessity to protect users and promote trust in order to 
maximize utility of new technologies like mobile money. Further 
these efforts may serve to encourage other African nations to 
explore privacy legislation. While protecting citizens should be a 
primary concern for policymakers, they must also seek balance in 
any law, working to ensure that new legislation is not overly 
prescriptive or burdensome for corporations bringing innovative 
tools to the marketplace. For instance, while many international 
businesses welcome the European’s new privacy plans to 
streamline privacy rules in a more centralized manner, these same 
companies also protest the regulation’s more stringent guidelines 
such as the proposal for an individual’s “right to be forgotten.”29 
While the proper balance between adequate protection and flexible 
business operations is certainly delicate, African leaders must act 
in order to ensure the ultimate success of mobile money. 
To address the lack of technical capacity, policy makers should 
stress the study of security, privacy, computer science and 
information programs in universities. There is a growing demand 
for African app developers, and universities will train many of 
25 See Harris et al., supra note 11. 
26 Daily Guide, Data Protection Bill Passed, GHANAWEB (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=229
717. 
27 Data Protection Act 843 of 2010 (Ghana), available at 
http://www.parliament.gh/assets/file/Bills/Data%20Protection%20Act,%202010
.pdf. 
28 UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 20. 
29 Privacy Laws: Private Data, Public Rules, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 
2012), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21543489. 
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them. These universities should insist on strong privacy and 
security backgrounds. These courses of study should be promoted 
as holding particular import for future development with incentives 
created to draw in prospective students. To help facilitate a greater 
emphasis on privacy and security at the university level, policy 
makers should encourage empowering partnerships with 
international institutions that excel in the field. For instance, the 
Rwandan government recently sponsored a Carnegie Mellon 
University campus in Kigali with the government committing to 
offer substantial scholarships to qualifying applicants. Carnegie 
Mellon’s Rwanda campus offers Masters of Science in Information 
Technology with the option to focus on cybersecurity and began 
classes in the fall of 2012.30 This action by the Rwandan 
government demonstrates a clear understanding from national 
leaders that technological advances must be accompanied with 
sufficient human capacity. Similar partnerships coupled with the 
promotion of security and privacy studies can help African nations 
make strides in addressing human capacity issues. 
African application developers and service providers can of 
course begin to place a greater emphasis on personal privacy and 
security by designing solutions to protect networks and data and 
providing users tools to protect themselves and their devices. In 
considering the problems of transparency in mobile money 
applications in the African context, developers could explore some 
of the benefits of e-cash, a primarily conceptual digital currency in 
which transactions are anonymous and funds cannot be double 
spent. Bitcoin is the most prominent manifestation of e-cash, 
although numerous technical and regulatory problems exist with 
this particular implementation.31 With proper research, mobile 
money applications may find some of the principles and features of 
e-cash useful in introducing layers of anonymity and protection for 
users. Finally, African nations should commission public 
awareness campaigns focused on cybersecurity and personal data. 
With relatively little money, public awareness campaigns can 
30 See Carnegie Mellon University in Rwanda, http://www.cmu.edu/ 
rwanda/. 
31 See Bitcoin Project, http://bitcoin.org/. 
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increase digital literacy, informing consumers of basic dos and do 
nots to protect themselves and others. 
 
B.  United States Policy 
 
Developed nations should pursue policy solutions as well. The 
safe and effective employment of mobile money across Africa is 
clearly in the interest of countries like the United States. Indeed, 
the United States has a number of applicable polices in place. 
Joining these policies with specific action to assist African nations 
can serve to address some of the potential problems. One of the 
most vocal proponents for a free and open Internet has been 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “The United States will 
continue to promote an Internet where people’s rights are protected 
and that it is open to innovation, interoperable all over the world, 
secure enough to hold people’s trust, and reliable enough to 
support their work.”32 These words have provided leadership for 
the United States to increase diplomatic pressure on offending 
governments and raise the costs of bad behavior. Because of her 
initiative, American embassies are poised to monitor for and 
respond to governmental abuse of digital technologies like mobile 
money. 
The forward leaning posture of Secretary Clinton should be 
matched with a clear policy on dual-use technology controls. The 
U.S. government needs to put careful thought into the export of 
technologies that can be used to block, monitor, or filter digital 
content as well as performing more benign and easily marketable 
tasks. Rebecca MacKinnon points out this fact and criticizes the 
U.S. government’s complicity: “American corporations are major 
suppliers of software and hardware used by all sorts of 
governments to carry out censorship and surveillance—and not just 
dictatorships.”33 Therefore, a policy is needed to sufficiently deter 
32 Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at George Washington 
University, Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a Networked 
World (Feb. 15, 2011), available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/ 
156619.htm. 
33 Rebecca MacKinnon, Internet Freedom Starts at Home, FOREIGN POLICY 
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/03/The_Worlds_ 
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repressive regimes from obtaining these tools and encouraging 
democratic governments not to abuse the capabilities of dual use 
technologies. While the United States has taken direct action in 
some of the most extreme cases, such as President Obama’s 
Executive Order banning the transfer of certain technologies to 
Iran and Syria,34 uniform guidance and consistent enforcement 
would offer more effective protection.  
The United States can and should also make efforts to assist 
African nations protecting individual privacy. The recently 
released White House Blueprint on Consumer Privacy protection 
identifies the needs for both consumer control of personal 
information and for the free flow of international data: “The United 
States is committed to engaging with its international partners to 
increase interoperability in privacy laws by pursuing mutual 
recognition, the development of codes of conduct through multi-
stakeholder processes, and enforcement cooperation.”35 If pursued 
with African partners, this policy can help ensure that African 
consumers are protected and African economies are equipped to 
engage in the global digital marketplace. 
Finally, the United States—and indeed other developed 
nations—must begin to prioritize cybersecurity cooperation with 
Africa. Appropriate high-level U.S. policies are in place,36 but 
significant implementation of those policies is yet to occur. The 
President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace commits the 
United States to working with developing countries to build 
cybersecurity capacity, develop and share best practices, offer 
cybercrime training, and to develop and deepen governmental ties 
No_1_Threat_to_Internet_Freedom. 
34 Exec. Order No. 13,606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,571 (Apr. 22, 2012), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-04-24/pdf/2012-10034.pdf. 
35 THE OBAMA ADMIN., THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A 
NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND 
PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 31 (2012), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
36 See THE OBAMA ADMIN., THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 
FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED 
WORLD (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf. 
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with counterparts and subject matter experts. To adequately 
achieve these commitments, Congress must first acknowledge and 
address the global nature of cyber insecurity in Africa. Then, 
significant additional resources are needed to allow U.S. experts to 
provide technical assistance to partner nations. Finally, there is a 
need to reconcile conflicts between the value of information 
sharing and the necessity of ensuring the integrity of classified 
material. American action alone cannot address the potential 
problems facing Africa, but the United States has adopted 
promising policies in the last few years that can serve to guide both 
American and global action in providing needed assistance. 
 
C.  Public Advocacy and Corporate Responsibility 
 
As new technologies proliferate, particularly in African settings 
with large populations of users less accustomed to these 
technologies, it is essential that public advocacy groups focus their 
attention on possible governmental or corporate abuse. Under the 
banner of Internet Freedom, human rights groups can monitor for 
abuse and apply international pressure to those most egregious 
abusers. Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Net” report is an 
excellent example of such an effort.37 By reporting broadly on the 
state of government Internet restrictions, Freedom House is 
providing an essential tool in helping to hold governments 
accountable. As African users adopt sophisticated and specific 
applications like mobile money, similar monitoring of 
governmental interference in these spaces should be established as 
well. 
Corporate responsibility is another vital piece in ensuring user 
safety and privacy. Service providers and banks have a 
responsibility to protect users’ data and finances through technical 
means as well through appropriate behavior and policies that do 
not expose users to abuse at the hands of repressive governments 
or unscrupulous third parties. Beyond a moral issue, widespread 
37 See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2011: A GLOBAL 
ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA (Sanja Kelly & Sarah Cook 
eds., 2011), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 
FOTN2011.pdf. 
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adoption of mobile money requires user trust. The necessity of 
trust should provide sufficient incentive for responsible corporate 
behavior. A positive example of companies proactively committing 
to responsible behavior is the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a 
multi-stakeholder group that includes Google, Microsoft, and 
Yahoo!.38 GNI attempts to assist technology companies in 
protecting privacy and free expression in the face of repressive 
regimes and can serve as a model for self-organized corporate 
commitment making. Where corporations are complicit in abuse, 
other institutions or legal mechanisms, as mentioned above, are 
appropriate.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There can be no doubt about the enormous potential for mobile 
money in Africa. For a continent plagued by limited banking 
options, mobile money has in just a short time brought millions to 
the ranks of financial inclusion. As part of the global effort to 
counter money laundering and terrorism, FATF requirements 
demand transparency of all financial services customers, including 
mobile money. The increased data collection associated with this 
transparency renders mobile money users in Africa particularly 
vulnerable to governmental or corporate abuse of the data 
generated by mobile transactions. Equally troubling are 
cybersecurity concerns, leaving African mobile money users in a 
doubly precarious position. Should mobile money platforms come 
to be inundated with privacy breaches and malware, users will lose 
trust in the application, reversing adoption trends and eliminating 
potential gains. It is therefore incumbent for all to act—
government, human rights watchdogs, corporations, and individual 
citizens—to address existing deficiencies and ensure that the 
power of mobile money will be enjoyed across Africa. 
  
38 See Global Networking Initiative, 
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/. 
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